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 Abstract 
We use the global LINKAGE model to assess the impact of trade and support policies 
in agriculture on income, trade, and output patterns. We provide order-of-magnitude 
estimates of the impacts of policy changes rather than point estimates. Two sets of 
simulations are used to identify key drivers in the results. One set decomposes the 
aggregate results by looking at the impacts of partial reforms, regionally and across 
instruments, to identify the relative contribution to global gains of reforms in 
industrialized and developing countries and of border protection versus domestic support. 
The second set responds to critics of trade reform (inflated gains for developing 
countries, no transition costs for industrial country farmers, uncertain supply response in 
developing countries). 
Reform of agriculture and food provides 70 percent of the global gains from 
merchandise trade reform of $385 billion. The global gains are shared equally among 
industrial and developing countries. Developing countries gain more as a share of initial 
income, and income gains occur in developing country agriculture, reducing poverty. 
Both groups of countries gain more from their own reforms than from the other group’s 
reforms. Productivity and supply assumptions affect impact assessment, but their 
influence is small and does not alter the main aggregate findings. Trade elasticities, 
however, are key in determining the overall level of the income gains. Higher elasticities 
dampen terms-of-trade effects and increase trade and real income gains more than 
proportionally and the converse is true for smaller elasticities. These effects can be very 
large for individual countries. 
 
Keywords: agricultural trade liberalization, developing countries, Doha Round, farm 
policy, WTO. 
 
 
  
GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL LIBERALIZATION: 
AN IN-DEPTH ASSESSMENT OF WHAT IS AT STAKE 
This paper extends and elaborates on our previous work on global agricultural trade 
policy analysis (Beghin, Roland-Holst, and van der Mensbrugghe 2003). This latest 
analysis uses a global dynamic applied general equilibrium model (LINKAGE) to assess 
how the multifarious trade and support policies in agriculture affect income, trade, and 
output patterns at the global level.1 Such models have become a standard tool for assess-
ing policy reforms because they capture linkages across sectors and regions (through 
trade) and because, by their nature, they have adding-up constraints so that supply and 
demand are in equilibrium in all markets. The analysis provides order-of-magnitude esti-
mates of the potential consequences of policy changes, rather than a single point or “best” 
estimate. It also looks at the induced structural changes, including cross-regional patterns 
of output and trade, which tend to be much larger than the more familiar gains to real in-
come. While income gains typically amount to 1 percent of base income or less, 
structural changes—for example, in sectoral output or trade—can be greater than 
50 percent. 
Two sets of simulations are used to create a deeper picture of what drives the key re-
sults. One set decomposes the aggregate results by looking at the impacts of partial 
reforms—both regionally and across instruments—to identify what share of the global 
gains derives from reform in industrial countries and from reform in developing coun-
tries, and what share is driven by border protection and by domestic support. The second 
set of simulations addresses issues raised by critics of trade reform, notably that the pre-
dicted gains for developing countries are too optimistic and that the transition costs for 
industrial country farmers are high and too often ignored. Concerns have also been raised 
about the ability of developing countries to respond to reforms and to achieve consis-
tently high productivity gains. To answer the questions about the impacts on developing 
countries, three assumptions are explored: the consequences of assuming differential and 
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lower agricultural productivity in some developing countries, the impacts of constraining 
output supply response in selected low-income countries, and estimates of trade elastic-
ities. The paper also assesses the impacts of slower exit by industrial-country farmers and 
how this would affect transition adjustments.  
Some of the main findings are as follows. 
• Reform of agriculture and food provides 70 percent of the global gains from mer-
chandise trade reform—$265 billion of a total of $385 billion. 
• The global gains are shared roughly equally between industrial and developing 
countries, but developing countries gain significantly more as a share of initial in-
come. Significant income gains occur in developing-country agriculture, where 
poverty tends to be concentrated. 
• Developing countries gain more from reforming their own support policies than 
from improved market access in industrial countries. Likewise, industrial countries 
also gain relatively more from their own reform. 
• Notwithstanding the overall benefits from greater openness, structural changes are 
important, and transition adjustments need to be addressed.  
• Productivity and supply assumptions affect impact assessment, but their influence 
is small, and they do not alter the main aggregate findings. Trade elasticities, how-
ever, are the key determinants in the overall level of the income gains. Higher 
elasticities dampen terms-of-trade effects and increase trade and real income gains 
more than proportionally, while the opposite is true for lower elasticities. These ef-
fects can be very large for individual countries. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the modeling framework 
in the next section, with a detailed description of the model baseline assumptions. Then, 
the following section looks at the impacts of agricultural reforms and provides a decom-
position of impacts by policy instrument. In the third section, sensitivity analysis is 
discussed along with its implications. Conclusions are last. An extensive annex is avail-
able from the authors. It includes a longer description of the model and parameter values, 
and detailed tables of individual-country results for the policy analysis and sensitivity 
analysis.  
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The Modeling Framework 
The LINKAGE model is based on a standard neoclassical general equilibrium model 
with firms maximizing profit in competitive markets and consumers maximizing well-
being under a budget constraint. The model has added features related to its dynamic na-
ture. It is global, with the world decomposed into 23 regions, and multisectoral, with 
economic activity aggregated into 22 sectors (Annex A, available from authors). Seven of 
the 23 regions are classified as high income (or industrial), including Canada, Western 
Europe (European Union-15 plus the European Free Trade Association countries), Japan, 
and the United States—the so-called Quad countries. The developing countries include 
some of the large countries that are important in agricultural markets as producers or as 
consumers (Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and Indonesia). The remaining developing 
countries are grouped into regional aggregations.2 The sectoral decomposition is concen-
trated in the agricultural and food sectors (15 of the 22 sectors).  
The LINKAGE model is dynamic, with scenarios spanning 1997 to 2015. The dynam-
ics include exogenously given labor and land growth rates, savings-driven investment and 
capital accumulation, and exogenous productivity growth. Structural changes over time 
are driven by differential growth rates and supply and demand parameters.3 Trade is 
modeled using the Armington assumption. Goods are differentiated by region of origin 
using a two-nested structure (domestic absorption first allocated across domestic and ag-
gregate import goods, then aggregate imports allocated across different regions of origin).  
Overview of Baseline Simulation 
Assessing the impacts of policy reforms requires two steps in the dynamic frame-
work of the LINKAGE model, a baseline (or reference) simulation and a reform simulation. 
The baseline involves running the model forward from its 1997 base year to 2015, with 
exogenous assumptions about labor and population growth rates, productivity, and de-
mand behavior parameters including savings, which determines the rate of capital 
accumulation (adjusted exogenously for depreciation).  
The baseline simulation can also incorporate changes in base-year policies, to take 
into account known changes in policies (between 1997 and the present) or anticipated 
changes. However, the baseline described in what follows assumes no changes in base-
year policies: they are held at their 1997 levels. Thus, the reform simulations reflect 
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changes from their 1997 levels, not changes that would be anticipated from 2004 levels.4 
It is unclear in which direction some past and anticipated changes would affect the global 
trade reform results. Some changes clearly reflect further opening, for example, China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and some bilateral free trade agree-
ments. Others would go in the opposite direction, for example, the changes to the U.S. 
farm support programs. 
Agriculture and Food Trends in the Baseline Scenario 
Trends in agriculture and food supply and demand across the globe as determined in 
the baseline scenario are driven in part by the macro environment (as described in Annex 
B, available from authors). But they are also driven by microeconomic assumptions about 
the mobility of factors, production technologies, income and price elasticities, and trade 
elasticities, among others. 
For agriculture and food between 2000 and 2015, both demand and production grow 
at 1.0–1.2 percent a year in industrial countries, and at a much higher 2.9–3.4 percent in 
developing countries (Tables 1 and 2 summarize the results; tables in the annex, available 
from the authors, provide details for individual countries). On a per capita basis there is 
more demand growth in developing countries, largely because of higher income elastic-
ities for food. Thus the baseline assumes that demand growth will be lower than output 
growth in industrial countries and higher than output growth in developing countries.  
With higher output growth than demand, industrial countries will see an increase in 
their exportable surplus. In the aggregate, their net agricultural and food trade will im-
prove dramatically, from a deficit of $17 billion in 2000 to a surplus of $50 billion in 
2015 (at 1997 prices). The opposite occurs in developing countries, where a net positive 
balance in agriculture and food turns into a large deficit of $50 billion, due mostly to a 
ballooning in processed food. Agriculture and food balances are positive for low-income 
countries in 2000 and 2015.  
Developing a baseline of the future world economy requires nuanced analysis. The 
country and regional growth rates used here are in line with consensus views, given 
stronger demographic trends and income elasticities for agriculture and food in develop-
ing economies. World and regional totals may be skewed by several factors. The weights
 TABLE 1. Trends in agriculture, 2000–15 
 
 
Average Annual Growth (percent) 
Net Trade  
(billion 1997 US$) 
 Output Demand Imports Exports 2000 2015 
High-income countries 1.2 1.1 1.9 3.0 -24.3 -3.1 
Low-income countries 3.6 3.5 4.4 5.5 9.9 21.6 
Middle-income countries 3.2 3.3 8.3 5.4 14.4 -18.5 
Low-income countries, excluding India 3.7 3.4 3.6 6.6 7.2 22.4 
Middle-income countries, including India 3.2 3.4 8.3 5.1 17.1 -19.3 
Developing countries 3.3 3.4 7.8 5.4 24.3 3.1 
World total 2.6 2.6 4.4 4.2 0.0 0.0 
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data. 
Note: Net trade is measured at FOB prices (imports exclude international trade and transport margins). 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2. Trends in processed foods, 2000–15 
 Average Annual Growth (percent) 
Net Trade  
(billion 1997 US$) 
 Output Demand Imports Exports 2000 2015 
High-income countries 1.2 1.0 1.3 2.4 7.7 53.5 
Low-income countries 3.3 3.4 3.9 2.2 3.6 1.8 
Middle-income countries 2.9 3.1 4.5 2.0 -11.3 -55.3 
Low-income countries, excluding India 3.1 3.3 3.8 2.2 1.8 -0.2 
Middle-income countries, including India 2.9 3.1 4.5 2.0 -9.5 -53.4 
Developing countries 2.9 3.2 4.5 2.1 -7.7 -53.5 
World total 1.8 1.8 2.4 2.3 0.0 0.0 
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data. 
Note: Net trade is measured at FOB prices (imports exclude international trade and transport margins). 
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 are biased toward industrial countries because of the use of base-year (1997) value 
shares. Volume shares would yield different figures. Demand growth in developing coun-
tries may be overstated because income elasticities are held constant at their base-year 
levels. It is plausible to argue that income elasticities would converge toward those of 
high-income countries as developing countries grow. The growth numbers are also 
broadly consistent with Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) historical trends. The 
discrepancy between agricultural growth and food processing originates in the growth in 
intermediate demand for agricultural products as food processing grows. A more meat-
intensive future world will also exhibit a slight acceleration in agricultural growth relative 
to food because of the feed input in the livestock sector. So, while the baseline scenario is 
plausible, aggregate growth rates should be used with caution for all these reasons. 
The biggest mover among developing countries is China, where the food deficit of 
$8 billion in 1997 would swell to somewhere around $120 billion by 2015. Demand is 
expected to outpace output by about 1 percentage point a year.5 In agriculture this pro-
vides new opportunities for sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, with both seeing a 
large rise in agricultural surplus (on an aggregate basis). Sub-Saharan Africa will none-
theless see a slight deterioration in its processed food balance. The aggregate net trade 
balances may mask more detailed sectoral shifts. For example, sub-Saharan Africa will 
continue to be a net importer of grains through the baseline scenario time horizon; there-
fore, a trade reform–induced rise in world prices could lead to a negative terms-of-trade 
shock since the agricultural commodities sub-Saharan Africa tends to export—for exam-
ple, coffee and cocoa—already have relatively free access. 
With relatively low demand growth in industrial countries and relatively high output 
growth, the exportable agricultural surplus will increase substantially, particularly from 
North America and Oceania. Europe and Japan are the exceptions, with output growth 
expected to be anemic. 
 
The Impacts of Agricultural Reform 
The impacts of agricultural trade reform are examined first in the context of global 
merchandise trade reform, and then the results are decomposed by type of reform and re-
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gion to assess the relative importance for developing countries of reforms in industrial 
countries and in developing countries. 
Results of Global Merchandise Trade Reform 
Global reform involves removing protection in all (nonservice) sectors, in all re-
gions, and for all instruments of protection (leaving other taxes unchanged, though lump 
sum taxes [or transfers] on households adjust to maintain a fixed government fiscal bal-
ance). The model contains six instruments of protection: 
• Import tariffs, eliminated only if they are positive.  
• Export subsidies, eliminated only if they are negative.6 
• Capital subsidies, with direct payments converted into subsidies on capital. 
• Land subsidies, with some payments also converted to subsidies on land. 
• Input subsidies. 
• Output subsidies. 
The overall measure of reform, referred to as real income, measures the extent to 
which households are better off in the post-reform scenario than in the baseline scenario 
in the year 2015.7 The world gain (measured in 1997 U.S. dollars) is $385 billion, an in-
crease from baseline income of some 0.9 percent (Table 3). The gains are relatively 
evenly divided between industrial countries ($188 billion) and developing countries 
($197 billion), but developing countries are considerably better off as a share of reference 
income, with a gain of 1.7 percent compared with 0.6 percent for industrial countries. 
Caveats. A few caveats about the basic global reform scenario are in order. First, 
there are known deficiencies in the base-year policies, which are taken from release 5.4 
of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database. Most preferential arrangements 
are not incorporated, including the Generalized System of Preferences and some regional 
trading agreements.8 Alternative scenarios could be undertaken to test their overall im-
portance, especially regarding the utilization rates of the preferences. Second, the 
reference scenario assumes no changes in the base-year policies between the base and 
terminal years. Thus, changes in trading regimes since 1997, such as China’s accession to 
  
TABLE 3. Real income gains and losses from global merchandise trade reform: Change from 2015 baseline 
 
All  
Instruments 
Tariffs 
Only 
Export  
Subsidies 
Only 
Capital  
Subsidies 
Only 
Land  
Subsidies 
Only 
Input  
Subsidies 
Only 
Output  
Subsidies 
Only 
Change in value (billion 1997 US$)        
High-income countries 188.3 160.4 1.4 1.1 -4.8 -0.3 9.0 
Low-income countries 31.9 34.6 -1.1 -0.1 -0.7 -0.3 0.2 
Middle-income countries 164.7 187.7 -7.0 -1.2 -7.3 -3.8 -6.4 
Low-income countries, excluding India 19.9 21.5 -0.9 -0.1 -0.6 -0.2 0.9 
Middle-income countries, including India 176.7 200.8 -7.3 -1.2 -7.4 -3.9 -7.0 
Developing countries 196.5 222.3 -8.2 -1.3 -8.1 -4.1 -6.2 
World total 384.8 382.7 -6.8 -0.2 -12.8 -4.4 2.8 
Percentage change        
High-income countries 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Low-income countries 1.6 1.7 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Middle-income countries 1.8 2.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 –0.1 
Low-income countries excl. India 1.9 2.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 
Middle-income countries incl. India 1.7 1.9 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 –0.1 
Developing countries 1.7 1.9 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 –0.1 
World total 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data. 
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the WTO, or anticipated changes, such as the elimination of the Multifibre Arrangement, 
are not taken into account.9 
Third, changes to some key assumptions or specifications could generate higher 
benefits. For example, raising the trade elasticities—as some have argued—dampens the 
negative terms-of-trade effects. Increasing returns to scale can generate greater efficiency 
improvements, depending on the structure of product markets and scale economies to be 
achieved. Reform of services could have economywide impacts to the extent that cheaper 
and more efficient services can lower production costs as well as improve real incomes. 
Changes in investment flows—not modeled here—have proven to be as important (some-
times more) as lowering trade barriers in many regional agreements. In a global model, 
the net change would be zero. Therefore, any reallocation of capital would leave some 
countries better off, all else remaining the same, while leaving others worse off (abstract-
ing from the benefits of future repatriated profits). Gross flows could have a greater 
impact than net capital flows to the extent that they raise productivity if they are associ-
ated with technology-laden capital goods. Finally, dynamic effects can also lead to a 
boost in the overall gains from reform. 
The global scenario captures some of the inherent dynamic gains, notably changes 
from savings and investment behavior. These can sometimes have a substantial impact to 
the extent that imported capital goods are taxed. Assuming that savings rates are un-
changed, a sharp fall in the price of capital goods can lead to a significant rise in 
investment (more bang per dollar invested). The scenario does not incorporate changes to 
productivity, however. The channels and magnitudes of trade-related changes to produc-
tivity are as yet poorly validated by solid empirical evidence, and attempts to incorporate 
these effects are largely simply illustrative of potential magnitudes. Recent World Bank 
reports suggest that these effects could be large, but the reports are really an appeal for 
more empirical research.10 
Decomposition by Instrument. The key finding on instruments of protection is the 
predominant role of tariffs. Removal of tariffs accounts for virtually all of the gains. The 
other instruments have much smaller impacts on real income—slightly positive on aver-
age for industrial countries and negative for developing countries taken together. For 
example, elimination of export subsidies negatively affects Africa—both North and sub-
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Saharan—and the Middle East, though it provides a positive benefit for Europe. Elimina-
tion of domestic protection also tends to be negative for developing countries and for 
industrial countries as well at times. The rest of sub-Saharan Africa is a notable excep-
tion, having an income gain of 0.6 percent. This could reflect the removal of significant 
output subsidies on cotton in some of the major producing countries (for example, China 
and the United States).  
The ambiguity of the welfare impact is in part driven by the nature of partial reforms. 
Removal of one form of protection may exacerbate the negative impacts of other forms of 
protection. For example, removal of output subsidies may worsen the impact of tariffs if 
removal of the subsidy leads to a reduction in output and an increase in imports. There 
are no robust theoretical arguments to determine which is more harmful. There are also 
other general equilibrium effects inherent in multisectoral global models. 
While the total measure of gain often garners the most attention—at least from poli-
cymakers and the media—more relevant for most players are the detailed structural 
results. By and large, it is the structural results that influence the political economy of 
reforms, particularly since the losers from reforms tend to be concentrated and a well-
identified pressure group, whereas the gainers are typically diffuse and harder to identify. 
For example, a 10 percent decline in the price of wheat could have a major impact on a 
farmer’s income but an almost imperceptible effect on the average consumer. 
With reform, industrial country aggregate agricultural output declines—by more than 
11 percent when all forms of protection are eliminated (Table 4). Removal of tariff pro-
tection generates the greatest change to production in industrial countries, but unlike the 
case with the welfare impacts, the other forms of protection have measurable, if smaller, 
impacts on output. Removal of output subsidies results in the next greatest change in ag-
ricultural output, driven largely by the nearly 5 percent output decline in the United 
States, though land and export subsidies have nearly the same aggregate impact. The de-
tailed results for the Quad countries confirm several points of common wisdom regarding 
the patterns of protection. First, the United States makes more use of output subsidies 
than do Europe and Japan. Europe makes greater use of export subsidies and direct pay-
ments (capital and land subsidies). Japanese protection is mostly in the form of import 
barriers.
  
TABLE 4. Agricultural output gains and losses from global merchandise trade reform: Change from 2015 baseline 
 
All  
Instruments 
Tariffs 
Only 
Export  
Subsidies 
Only 
Capital 
Subsidies 
Only 
Land  
Subsidies 
Only 
Input  
Subsidies 
Only 
Output  
Subsidies 
Only 
Change in value (billion 1997 US$)        
High-income countries -109.7 -56.2 -9.5 -1.6 -10.4 -7.4 -12.0 
Low-income countries 14.8 11.5 1.1 0.0 0.7 0.4 2.0 
Middle-income countries 41.8 18.1 8.2 -0.2 8.5 0.5 9.3 
Low-income countries, excluding India 13.7 10.5 0.9 0.0 0.5 0.3 2.8 
Middle-income countries, including India 42.9 19.2 8.4 -0.2 8.7 0.6 8.6 
Developing countries 56.6 29.7 9.3 -0.1 9.2 0.9 11.3 
World total -53.1 -26.6 -0.2 -1.7 -1.2 -6.5 -0.7 
Percentage change        
High-income countries -11.1 -5.7 -1.0 -0.2 -1.1 -0.7 -1.2 
Low-income countries 2.4 1.8 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 
Middle-income countries 2.4 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 
Low-income countries, excluding India 4.1 3.1 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.8 
Middle-income countries, including India 2.1 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 
Developing countries 2.4 1.2 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.5 
World total -1.6 -0.8 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data. 
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Results of Agricultural Reform 
Full merchandise trade reform provides a benchmark from which to judge the maxi-
mal effects from reform. This section focuses on the agricultural and food sectors.  
Real Income Gains. If all regions remove all protection in agriculture and food, the 
global gains in 2015 amount to $265 billion—nearly 70 percent of the gains from full 
merchandise trade reform (see Table 5). This is remarkable considering the small size of 
agriculture and food in global output (Figure 1).11 Agriculture represents less than 
2 percent of output for industrial countries and 10.5 percent for developing countries, 
while processed foods represent 4.5 percent for industrial countries and 7.5 percent for 
developing countries. Agriculture is still a relatively high 19 percent of output in the low-
income developing countries. Clearly, protection tends to be higher in agriculture and 
food than in other sectors, particularly in industrial countries but in middle-income coun-
tries as well. Protection is more uniform in low-income countries. 
For low-income countries the gains from global free trade in agriculture and food 
amount to around one-third of the gains from global free trade in all merchandise. This is 
a consequence of their dependence on imports of the most protected food items—such as 
grains—while they are net exporters of commodities with little or no protection. The 
middle-income countries gain 71 percent from global free trade in agriculture and food, 
nearly as much as industrial countries, which gain 72 percent as compared with full mer-
chandise trade reform 
If reforms are limited to high-income countries—a super version of special and dif-
ferential treatment—with perhaps an agreement by middle-income countries to bind at 
existing levels of protection, global gains drop to $102 billion, indicating that a signifi-
cant portion of the global gains is generated by removal of agricultural barriers in 
developing countries (see Table 5).12 The drop in gains is particularly striking for mid-
dle-income countries, where the gains from their own agricultural and food reform 
would be quite substantial. On a percentage basis, this is less so for low-income coun-
tries. The industrial countries reap gains of $92 billion, implying that agricultural 
reform in developing countries could generate gains of about $45 billion for the indus-
trial countries.
  
TABLE 5. Real income gains from agricultural and food trade reform: Change from 2015 baseline  
(billion 1997 US$) 
 
Global Merchandise 
Trade Reforms 
Agricultural and Food 
Trade Reform 
Agricultural Trade 
Reform Only 
 Global Global 
High-Income 
Countries 
High-Income 
Countries 
High-income countries 188.3 136.6 92.0 29.3 
Low-income countries 31.9 10.3 3.0 1.1 
Middle-income countries 164.7 118.2 6.9 -4.9 
Low-income countries, excluding India 19.9 8.4 3.6 1.6 
Middle-income countries, including India 176.7 120.1 6.4 -5.3 
Developing countries 196.5 128.6 10.0 -3.8 
World total 384.8 265.2 102.0 25.5 
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.
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FIGURE 1. Output structure in base year, 1997 
 
The final decomposition scenario is to assess the impacts of reform in agriculture 
alone in industrial countries, leaving protection unchanged for processed foods. This 
lowers the gains substantially for industrial countries—from $92 billion to $29 billion 
(see Table 5). Protection is high in both sectors, and the processed foods sector is more 
than twice as large as the agricultural sector. Furthermore, in a partial reform scenario, 
the efficiency gains in agriculture could be offset to some extent by further losses in 
processed foods. Output will expand in the processed food sector as resources are moved 
around, and the lower costs of inputs will also provide incentives to increase output. 
Middle-income countries could lose from an agriculture-only reform in industrial coun-
tries. They would benefit little from improved market access in agriculture, and in a 
partial reform scenario expansion of their protected domestic agriculture and food pro-
duction leads to efficiency losses that are not compensated elsewhere. 
To conclude, global agricultural trade reform generates a huge share of the gains to 
be made from merchandise trade reform. Market access into industrial countries provides 
Global Agricultural Liberalization: An In-Depth Assessment of What Is At Stake / 15 
 
significant gains, but a greater share of the gains for developing countries comes from 
agricultural trade reform among developing countries. Finally, reform in agriculture alone 
provides few benefits. It needs to be linked to reform in the processed food sectors. 
Structural Implications. Accelerating integration is one of the key goals of trade re-
form. Beyond the efficiency gains that come from allocating resources to their best uses, 
integration is expected to bring productivity increases—scale economies, greater com-
petitiveness, ability to import technology-laden intermediate goods and capital, greater 
market awareness, and access to networks.  
The potential changes in trade from global reform of agriculture and food are large. 
World trade in these two sectors could jump by more than a half a trillion dollars in 2015 
(compared with the baseline), an increase of 74 percent (Table 6). Exports in agriculture 
and food from developing countries would jump $300 billion, an increase of over 
115 percent, with industrial country exports increasing $220 billion, or 50 percent. On the 
flip side, imports from both industrial and developing countries would rise substantially. 
The net trade position of industrial countries would deteriorate marginally—from 
$50 billion in the baseline in 2015 to $48 billion after global reform of agriculture and 
food. The marginal improvement for developing countries decomposes into a boost of 
nearly $12 billion for low-income countries and deterioration for middle-income coun-
tries of nearly $10 billion. 
If the reform is limited to industrial countries, the picture is modified significantly. 
First, the change in imports for industrial countries is almost identical under the two 
scenarios—$223 billion with full reform and $205 billion with industrial country re-
form only (see Table 6). Developing countries see a significant rise in exports but to 
industrial countries only, with little or no change in their own imports. Thus, industrial 
countries would witness a much sharper deterioration in their net food bill, with net im-
ports registering a change of $142 billion instead of $2 billion, as under the global 
reform scenario. The United States and Europe bear the brunt of the adjustment, with 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand seeing little difference between the global and par-
tial reform scenarios. In other words, these three countries reap much of the trade 
benefits from greater market access within industrial countries. Opening up of markets 
in developing countries significantly dampens the adjustment process for the United
 TABLE 6. Impact of global agricultural and food reform on agricultural and food trade: Change from 2015 baseline 
 Exports Imports Net Trade 2015 
  Global Industrial Global Industrial Global Industrial Baseline 
Change in value (billion 1997 US$)     
High-income countries 221.2 63.4 223.3 205.3 -2.1 -141.9 50.4 
Low-income countries 41.0 20.9 29.2 -0.3 11.8 21.2 23.4 
Middle-income countries 260.1 120.5 269.8 -0.2 -9.7 120.7 -73.8 
Low-income countries, excluding India 33.8 17.5 21.9 0.1 11.8 17.5 22.2 
Middle-income countries, including India 267.3 123.9 277.1 -0.5 -9.8 124.4 -72.7 
Developing countries 301.1 141.4 299.0 -0.4 2.1 141.9 -50.4 
World total 522.3 204.9 522.3 204.9 0.0 0.0 0 
Percentage change       
High-income countries 50 14 57 52    
Low-income countries 74 38 92 -1    
Middle-income countries 125 58 96 0    
Low-income countries, excluding India 70 36 84 0    
Middle-income countries, including India 125 58 96 0    
Developing countries 115 54 95 0    
World total 74 29 74 29     
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data. 
Note: The columns labeled “Global” refer to the impacts from global agriculture and food reform. The columns labeled “Industrial” refer to industrial-country only reform of 
agricultural and food.
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States and Europe, and the United States would reinforce its net exporting status sig-
nificantly under a global reform scenario.  
Most developing countries see a greater improvement in their net food trade with in-
dustrial-country-only reform than with global reform. However, Argentina, Brazil, and 
the rest of East Asia improve their net food trade more with global reform than with par-
tial reform. They would gain additional market access from developing countries and 
reinforce their comparative advantage over more highly protected countries in East Asia. 
The biggest beneficiary on net terms would be China. While its (small) exports would not 
change much, removal of its own protection would induce a huge shift in imports. The 
lack of reform under the partial reform scenario means that instead of its net food posi-
tion deteriorating by $74 billion in the global reform scenario, it sees a small 
improvement of $6 billion. Taken together for developing countries, the partial reform 
would generate an improvement in net trade of food of $142 billion.  
The structural impacts previously described are associated with global changes in the 
distribution of farm income. With global agriculture and food reform, farm incomes 
barely change at the global level (a loss of perhaps $10 billion13 or 0.6 percent of baseline 
2015 farm income). Changes are much more significant at the regional level (Figures 2 
and 3). The largest absolute gains in farm income are in the Americas, Australia and New 
Zealand, and developing East Asia excluding China. Latin America would receive 
40 percent of the total positive gains; Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, 18 percent; 
and the United States, 15 percent.  
The relative position of regional gainers is somewhat different, however (see Figure 
3). Farmers in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand gain the most from global free trade 
in agriculture and food, with income gains of 50–65 percent. Farmers in a number of de-
veloping regions have gains of more than 25 percent, including Vietnam, Argentina, 
countries of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU), the rest of East Asia (which 
includes Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines), and the rest of Latin America. 
The farmers who lose most are in China, with potential losses of $75 billion in 2015 
compared with the baseline scenario.14 The next biggest losers are farmers in Western 
Europe and the developed East Asian economies—Japan; the Republic of Korea; and 
Taiwan, China. In percentage terms, the biggest losses occur in Japan (30 percent) and  
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FIGURE 2. Change in rural value added from baseline in 2015 (billion 1997 US$) 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3. Percentage change in rural value added from baseline in 2015 
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Western Europe (24 percent), with China’s losses down to about 15 percent because of its 
huge rural economy. 
Most of the impact on rural incomes is generated by volume changes, not factor re-
turns. Both labor and capital returns are determined essentially on national markets.15 
Thus, wage changes are modest overall, with generally greater impacts in developing 
countries, where more labor is employed in agriculture (Table 7). For example, unskilled 
wages increase 8 percent in Argentina and Vietnam, and 5–6 percent in the rest of Latin 
America and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Unskilled workers in Australia and New 
Zealand also benefit from these reforms. Unskilled workers in developing countries gen-
erally do better in relative terms than do skilled workers, largely as a result of their 
concentration in agricultural sectors. China is a significant exception. Removal of its ag-
ricultural protection lowers demand for unskilled workers, and their wages decline. The 
impact on wages in the European Union and Japan is negligible, as agriculture employs a 
very small share of the national labor force. 
As in the labor markets, the returns in capital market are determined mainly at the 
national level (Table 8). Thus, changes to income will largely be reflected in volume 
changes, not in price changes. However, direct payments to farmers are implemented as 
an ad valorem subsidy on capital (and land), thus creating a wedge between the cost to 
farmers and the returns to owners. Removal of the capital subsidy has little effect on 
owners since the return is determined at the economywide level, but it raises the costs to 
farmers. For example, the cost of capital net of subsidies increases by almost 1 percent in 
the European Union, but the average cost to farmers increases by 22 percent—and even 
more for livestock producers (43 percent). Note that these capital subsidies are used 
mainly in industrial countries, so for most developing countries there is no difference be-
tween the owner return and the cost to farmers. 
The changes in the contribution of land to agricultural incomes are driven largely by 
price movements—contrary to the case for labor and capital income (Table 9). Land is 
essentially a fixed factor in agriculture, with some allowance for movements up and 
down the supply curve and for cross-sectoral shifts in land usage.16 In Europe, the aver-
age return to land drops 66 percent, with the supply of land falling 9 percent. Farmers 
gain some benefit in lower unit costs because of falling land prices. But removal of the 
 TABLE 7. Impact of global agriculture and food reform on agricultural employment and wages: Change from 2015  
baseline (percent) 
 Total Agriculture Cereals and Sugar Livestock and Dairy 
  Wages  Wages  Wages 
 
Employ-
ment Unskilled Skilled 
Employ-
ment Unskilled Skilled 
Employ-
ment Unskilled Skilled 
Canada 8.5 1.0 0.8 30.4 1.0 0.8 -15.5 1.0 0.8 
United States 0.4 0.6 0.6 -12.4 0.6 0.6 3.3 0.6 0.6 
European Union with EFTA -23.7 -0.6 0.4 -57.7 -0.6 0.4 -28.0 -0.6 0.4 
Australia and New Zealand 18.2 3.4 2.3 25.6 3.4 2.3 31.1 3.4 2.3 
Japan -26.8 -0.9 -0.1 -28.9 -0.9 -0.1 -46.2 -0.9 -0.1 
Korea, Rep., and Taiwan, China -13.8 -0.2 0.7 -3.9 -0.2 0.7 8.2 -0.2 0.7 
Hong Kong (China) and Singapore 8.8 1.0 0.8 28.8 1.0 0.8 -2.0 1.0 0.8 
Argentina 13.3 7.9 5.5 25.8 7.9 5.5 14.3 7.9 5.5 
Brazil 12.5 3.4 3.0 25.8 3.4 3.0 11.7 3.4 3.0 
China -6.6 -3.1 0.0 -26.6 -3.1 0.0 8.6 -3.1 0.0 
India -0.3 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.2 1.1 0.0 0.2 
Indonesia 4.3 1.4 -0.3 6.1 1.4 -0.3 -2.0 1.4   
Mexico 5.0 1.3 -0.2 1.3 1.3 -0.2 -4.8 1.3 -0.2 
SACU 13.8 1.3 1.1 31.7 1.3 1.1 8.8 1.3 1.1 
Turkey 5.2 3.0 0.5 -15.3 3.0 0.5 -18.7 3.0 0.5 
Vietnam 17.0 7.8 3.0 63.1 7.8 3.0 -15.4 7.8 3.0 
Rest of East Asia 11.6 2.7 0.9 72.0 2.7 0.9 -9.1 2.7 0.9 
Rest of South Asia -1.3 -0.2 0.0 1.1 -0.2 0.0 0.7 -0.2 0.0 
EU accession countries 6.9 1.6 0.9 12.8 1.6 0.9 13.3 1.6 0.9 
Rest of Europe and Central Asia -0.4 -1.0 -0.3 0.3 -1.0 -0.3 -2.4 -1.0 -0.3 
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa 6.2 6.0 1.9 17.9 6.0 1.9 1.2 6.0 1.9 
Rest of Latin America 6.2 5.4 3.4 17.9 5.4 3.4 42.6 5.4 3.4 
Rest of the World including Middle 
East and North Africa -0.1 -0.3 0.9 2.6 -0.3 0.9 -4.2 -0.3 0.9 
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data. 
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 TABLE 8. Impact of global agricultural and food trade reform on agricultural capital: Change from 2015 baseline  
(percent) 
 Total Agriculture Grains and Sugar Livestock and Dairy 
 Volume 
Owners’ 
Return 
Farmers’ 
Cost Volume 
Owners’ 
Return 
Farmers’ 
Cost Volume 
Owners’ 
Return 
Farmers’ 
Cost 
Canada -4.9 -0.5 4.1 7.2 -0.5 3.1 -17.0 -0.5 7.1 
United States 0.8 0.7 2.6 -19.2 0.7 2.6 4.5 0.7 6.5 
European Union with EFTA -32.9 0.7 21.8 -67.1 0.7 21.7 -29.2 0.8 43.1 
Australia and New Zealand 40.2 0.6 1.2 3.0 0.7 1.3 123.5 0.6 1.7 
Japan -22.9 1.7 4.9 -25.0 1.7 7.6 -47.0 1.7 12.2 
Korea, Rep., and Taiwan, China -4.3 0.7 12.0 8.9 0.8 15.4 17.5 0.8 103.8 
Hong Kong (China) and Singapore 9.8 0.7 0.7 75.4 0.7 0.7 -4.3 0.7 0.7 
Argentina 6.0 4.2 4.2 9.0 4.2 4.2 17.9 4.2 4.2 
Brazil 10.1 3.1 3.1 21.9 3.1 3.1 9.8 3.1 3.1 
China -2.7 3.2 3.2 -17.5 3.2 3.2 5.8 3.2 3.2 
India 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 1.2 0.1 0.1 
Indonesia 0.7 -0.2 -0.2 1.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.9 -0.2 -0.2 
Mexico 4.3 -0.1 3.7 2.3 -0.1 4.4 -7.5 -0.1 9.1 
SACU 19.5 -0.6 -0.6 39.4 -0.6 -0.6 25.4 -0.6 -0.6 
Turkey 0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -15.8 -0.4 0.5 -15.1 -0.4 -0.4 
Vietnam 2.4 1.8 1.8 28.7 1.8 1.8 -13.3 1.8 1.8 
Rest of East Asia 20.9 0.2 0.2 36.5 0.2 0.2 -8.6 0.2 0.2 
Rest of South Asia 0.1 1.3 1.3 2.3 1.3 1.3 0.7 1.2 1.2 
EU accession countries -0.2 0.5 21.6 7.7 0.5 18.9 -6.3 0.5 67.6 
Rest of Europe and Central Asia -2.5 1.6 7.7 -1.9 1.6 8.3 -5.8 1.6 9.3 
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa 0.5 –1.1 –1.1 5.6 –1.1 –1.1 4.0 –1.1 –1.1 
Rest of Latin America 6.2 1.8 1.8 15.9 1.8 1.8 41.1 1.8 1.8 
Rest of the World including Middle 
East and North Africa 0.3 –0.2 –0.2 2.9 –0.2 –0.2 –3.7 –0.2 –0.2 
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data. 
G
lobal Agricultural Liberalization: An In-D
epth Assessm
ent of W
hat Is At Stake / 21
  
TABLE 9. Impact of global agriculture and food reform on agricultural land: Change from 2015 baseline (percent)  
 Total Agriculture Cereals and Sugar Livestock and Dairy 
  Price  Price  Price 
 Land Owner Farmer Land Owner Farmer Land Owner Farmer
Canada -6.4 69.5 133.8 6.6 76.9 192.8 -25.2 56.8 83.5 
United States 2.4 -5.1 22.1 -19.0 -12.5 42.1 12.3 -0.2 9.1 
European Union with EFTA -9.4 -66.3 -57.0 -58.9 -74.1 -4.7 -3.5 -65.0 -59.7 
Australia and New Zealand 6.2 197.8 219.1 1.9 197.0 224.0 34.8 219.6 252.4 
Japan -21.0 -44.9 -41.5 -24.0 -45.5 -34.6 -34.1 -48.9 -48.9 
Korea, Rep., and Taiwan, China -11.4 -27.6 -27.1 -0.2 -25.3 -24.6 4.1 -23.0 -20.9 
Hong Kong (China) and Singapore 11.1 64.2 64.2 -22.0 45.0 45.0 -2.3 58.0 58.0 
Argentina 4.5 56.2 56.2 11.4 59.5 59.5 12.0 60.0 60.0 
Brazil 9.9 18.0 18.0 23.8 22.9 22.9 8.6 17.6 17.6 
China -0.9 -25.7 -25.7 -21.1 -31.1 -31.1 7.6 -23.6 -23.6 
India 0.0 -1.8 -1.8 0.8 -1.5 -1.5 1.4 -1.3 -1.3 
Indonesia 0.7 10.9 10.9 2.1 11.4 11.4 -1.8 10.0 10.0 
Mexico 2.7 0.6 13.1 -8.9 -3.6 52.1 -1.6 -0.6 0.8 
Southern African Customs Union 8.0 86.4 86.4 26.4 95.2 95.2 4.5 84.9 84.9 
Turkey 0.8 47.3 47.3 -14.9 39.0 39.0 -20.2 36.1 36.1 
Vietnam -0.3 44.6 44.6 33.2 60.3 60.3 -16.0 38.1 38.1 
Rest of East Asia -1.5 34.1 34.1 43.7 53.8 53.8 -9.6 32.7 32.7 
Rest of South Asia -0.1 -6.0 -6.0 3.2 -5.0 -5.0 1.3 -5.4 -5.4 
EU accession countries 2.6 2.0 6.1 4.6 2.8 10.8 7.5 3.5 8.8 
Rest of Europe and Central Asia -1.5 -2.4 -2.4 -1.1 -2.3 -2.3 -1.2 -2.2 -2.2 
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa -0.3 62.8 62.8 9.0 67.9 67.9 -2.4 61.7 61.7 
Rest of Latin America 1.0 55.4 55.4 5.0 58.6 58.6 40.3 74.9 74.9 
Rest of the World including Middle 
East and North Africa 0.0 0.1 0.1 2.7 0.8 0.8 -4.3 -1.2 -1.2 
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data. 
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direct subsidy does not allow farmers to reap the full cost gains from falling land prices. 
The average cost for farmers drops 57 percent, lower than the drop in the rental price of 
land (66 percent). And the change in the cost structure is highly sector specific. Thus, ce-
real and grain farmers see a small drop in their net cost of land (5 percent); however, the 
drop in the price of land does not compensate for removal of the subsidies since the re-
turns to owners fall by 74 percent. This is not the case in the livestock sector, where 
subsidy payments are linked to capital (the herds) and not to land. The impacts in the 
United States are muted, with the overall return to landowners changing slightly—a de-
cline of 5 percent—but costs to farmers increasing substantially—22 percent on average 
and more than 42 percent for cereal and sugar producers. 
In most developing countries, land prices increase substantially, except in China and 
in a few other regions. This may reduce to some extent the positive distributional impacts 
from relatively higher wages for unskilled labor since land ownership may not necessar-
ily be congruent with the unskilled labor working the land. There are some interesting 
sectoral shifts. For example, China would see more land devoted to livestock and dairy, 
and less to cereals, which would be imported from lower-cost sources. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
This section uses sensitivity analysis to explore how results change when some of the 
basic assumptions of the model change. It focuses on four areas:  
• The agricultural productivity assumptions of the standard baseline scenario. Agri-
cultural productivity is cut by 1 percentage point in developing countries and the 
results from global agriculture and food reform are compared with the results us-
ing the default productivity assumptions. In a separate analysis, productivity is 
increased for middle-income developing countries. 
• The impacts of the mobility of agricultural capital. Agricultural capital is more 
closely tied to the sector, making it more difficult to shed and leading to a different 
transition when reform is undertaken.  
• Sensitivity of the results to supply rigidities in developing countries.  
• Sensitivity of the results to the key trade elasticities. 
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Agricultural Productivity 
Agricultural productivity is assumed to grow 2.5 percent a year globally in the stan-
dard baseline scenario based on existing evidence (Martin and Mitra 1996, 1999). This 
may be too optimistic for developing countries, particularly for low-income countries. 
This assumption may have an impact on long-term self-sufficiency rates, particularly of 
sensitive commodities. The more that trade reform raises the world price of food, the 
more net food importers will be adversely affected by negative terms-of-trade shocks. To 
test the sensitivity of the trade results to agricultural productivity, a different baseline was 
construed with agricultural productivity improving at a slower 1.5 percent for developing 
countries but remaining at 2.5 percent for industrial countries.  
Trade Impact. Under the standard baseline, high-income countries go from a position 
of net food importers in 1997 to net food exporters in 2015 (Table 10). Low-income 
countries improve their position significantly, going from a positive food balance of 
$12.5 billion in 1997 to $23 billion in 2015. The position of middle-income countries de-
teriorates, however. Under the low-productivity baseline, the net food trade position of 
industrial countries increases substantially—jumping to $151 billion in 2015 compared 
with only $50 billion in the standard baseline. Low-income countries still maintain a 
positive balance but one that is much closer to zero than in the previous baseline. And the 
net food trade situation of middle-income countries shows a greater dependence on world 
markets.  
Whereas reform in the standard baseline positions low-income countries as net food 
exporters and has only a mild negative effect on the food balance of high- and middle-
income countries, under the low-productivity assumption the food trade balance of the 
high-income countries improves substantially—by $30 billion—largely because of an 
increased dependence on food imports by middle-income countries. The low-income 
countries still see an improvement in their trade balance but by a more modest 
$3.6 billion rather than the nearly $12 billion using the standard productivity assump-
tions. 
Output Impact. Average annual agricultural output growth in developing countries 
slows from 3.3 percent in the standard baseline to 2.6 percent in the low-productivity 
baseline (Table 11). In industrial countries, higher productivity provides an opportunity
 TABLE 10. Net trade impacts assuming lower agricultural productivity in developing countries (billion 1997 US$) 
 Standard Productivity Low Productivity 
  Baseline Reform Baseline Reform 
 1997 2015 2015 2015 2015 
High-income countries -23.1 50.4 48.4 151.2 181.6 
Low-income countries 12.5 23.4 35.2 0.9 4.5 
Middle-income countries 10.5 -73.8 -83.6 -152.0 -186.1 
Low-income countries, excluding India 7.4 22.2 34.1 8.5 17.2 
Middle-income countries, including India 15.6 -72.7 -82.4 -159.7 -198.9 
Developing countries 23.1 -50.4 -48.4 -151.2 -181.6 
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data. 
 
 
 
TABLE 11. Impacts on output assuming lower agricultural productivity for developing countries 
 
Growth in 2000–15  
(percent) 
Baseline Difference  
in 2015  
Difference Between Baseline and Reform  
Scenario in 2015 
 
Low  
Baseline 
Standard 
Baseline
Value  
(billion $) 
Percentage 
Change 
Low  
(billion $) 
Standard  
(billion $) 
Low  
(percent) 
Standard 
(percent) 
High-income countries 1.9 1.2 122.6 12.4 -100.0 -107.7 -9.0 -10.9 
Low-income countries 2.8 3.6 -71.6 -11.4 8.7 12.1 1.6 1.9 
Middle-income countries 2.6 3.2 -166.2 -9.4 27.0 37.2 1.7 2.1 
Low-income countries, excluding 
India 3.0 3.7 -39.4 -11.6 10.3 12.3 3.4 3.6 
Middle-income countries,  
including India 2.6 3.2 -198.4 -9.7 25.4 37.0 1.4 1.8 
Developing countries 2.6 3.3 -237.8 -10.0 35.7 49.4 1.7 2.1 
World total 2.4 2.6 -115.2 -3.4 -64.3 -58.3 -2.0 -1.7 
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.  
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 to gain market share, and higher world prices relative to the original baseline provide 
greater incentives to produce. World output under the alternative scenario declines 
3.4 percent (higher prices lead to reduced demand), with a reallocation between industrial 
and developing countries. Industrial countries benefit from a 12 percent increase in out-
put in 2015 compared with the standard baseline, whereas developing-country output is 
reduced by some 10 percent.  
With respect to output impacts following the trade reform scenario, the qualitative 
results of the different baseline assumptions of agricultural productivity are identical—
trade reform of agriculture and food lead to a shift in agricultural production from indus-
trial to developing countries. In the standard baseline, developing-country agricultural 
output increases more than 2 percent, whereas in the low-productivity baseline the in-
crease is only 1.7 percent. The decline in industrial countries drops to 9 percent, from 
11 percent in the standard baseline. The changes in output patterns across regions are 
identical, though the magnitudes differ. 
Aggregate Welfare. The change in the agricultural productivity assumption translates 
into modest changes in aggregate welfare (Figure 4). Industrial countries see an im-
provement of $18 billion in 2015, a jump in gains of about 0.05 percentage point.  
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Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data. 
Figure 4. Welfare impacts of productivity changes 
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Developing countries see a reduction in their welfare gains, with low-income countries 
seeing a drop of $1.4 billion (0.08 percentage point) and middle-income countries a drop 
of $17.8 billion (0.19 percentage point). 
A High Productivity Assumption. Many middle-income countries such as Argentina, 
Brazil, and Thailand have experienced rapid growth in agriculture, suggesting the poten-
tial for higher productivity growth than assumed in the standard baseline. To explore this, 
agricultural productivity growth was raised from 2.5 percent to 4.0 percent for middle-
income countries (China, India, Indonesia, rest of East Asia, Vietnam, Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico, rest of Latin America, the EU accession countries, rest of Europe and Central 
Asia, and Turkey).  
Changes are as expected. Agricultural supply and exports expand for natural export-
ers such as Argentina and Brazil. China, the largest middle-income importer, reduces its 
deficit by about $18 billion (Table 12). The middle-income group, including India, ex-
periences a net surplus of $30 billion in 2015, whereas under the standard baseline it has 
a deficit of $19 billion. High-income countries experience a deterioration of their net ag-
ricultural trade of about $50 billion, compared with $3 billion in the standard baseline, 
and Europe’s deficit increases to nearly $60 billion. Results for the food sector are quali-
tatively similar but smaller in size, with an increase in competitiveness of food processing 
in middle-income countries and a decrease in net trade by high-income countries relative 
to the standard baseline (Table 13). These large changes show how sensitive baseline tra-
jectories are to changes in assumptions about the future. They do not, however, affect the 
impact of the reform scenario measured in deviations from the baseline. 
In conclusion, the baseline assumptions regarding productivity are important, though 
changes in the assumption would not yield substantially different results from agriculture 
and food trade reform for developing countries in terms of net benefits and agricultural 
output.17 However, lower productivity would reduce the level of food self-sufficiency 
among developing countries—particularly middle-income countries—and could lead to a 
different assessment of the direction of food self-sufficiency in the aftermath of reform.
 TABLE 12. Baseline trends in agriculture with higher agricultural productivity in middle-income countries 
 
Average Annual Growth 
2000-15 (percent) 
Net Trade 
(billions of 1997 US$) 
 Output Demand Imports Exports 2000 2015 
High-income countries 0.6 1.0 2.7 0.9 -24.3 -50.2 
Low-income countries 3.9 3.8 4.0 6.2 9.9 25.2 
Middle-income countries 3.7 3.6 7.5 7.2 14.4 24.9 
Low-income countries, excluding India 3.8 3.5 4.0 6.2 7.2 19.1 
Middle-income countries, including India 3.7 3.7 7.4 7.1 17.1 31.1 
Developing countries 3.7 3.7 7.0 7.0 24.3 50.2 
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.  
Note: Net trade is measured at FOB prices (imports exclude international trade and transport margins). 
 
TABLE 13. Baseline trends in food processing with higher agricultural productivity in middle-income countries 
 
Average Annual Growth 
2000-15 (percent) 
Net Trade 
(billions of 1997 US$) 
 Output Demand Imports Exports 2000 2015 
High-income countries 1.1 1.0 1.4 2.0 7.7 36.2 
Low-income countries 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.2 3.6 4.4 
Middle-income countries 3.1 3.3 4.1 2.6 -11.3 -40.6 
Low-income countries, excluding India 3.2 3.3 3.7 2.2 1.8 -0.1 
Middle-income countries, including India 3.1 3.3 4.1 2.8 -9.5 -36.2 
Developing countries 3.2 3.3 4.1 2.7 -7.7 -36.2 
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data.  
Note: Net trade is measured at FOB prices (imports exclude international trade and transport margins). 
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Mobility of Agricultural Capital and the Transition in Industrial Countries 
The focus so far has been mainly on the long-term impact of the removal of protec-
tion, with little attention to the transitional impacts. A key mechanism of the model is the 
vintage structure of capital. Sectors in decline have excess capital that will not readily be 
used in other sectors. This is certainly the case with agricultural capital, although some 
could be used for nonagricultural purposes and other equipment could be used in nonpro-
tected agricultural sectors.  
Excess capital is released to other sectors following an upward-sloping supply curve. 
The value for the supply elasticity in the standard model is 4. To test the importance of 
this elasticity, the reform scenario is simulated again but with a supply elasticity of 0.5. 
This makes excess supply much less mobile and, all else equal, will tend to increase sup-
ply relative to the same simulation with a higher supply elasticity. 
Consider the case for the sugar sector in Europe. The starting point is 2004, since the 
trade reform starts in 2005. Under the baseline, sugar output in Europe increases mod-
estly between 2004 and 2015 (Figure 5). With the start of reform, output drops rapidly,  
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Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data. 
FIGURE 5. Sugar output in Europe (billion US$) 
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and by 2015 output has fallen from about $42 billion to about $11 billion. The supply 
elasticity has an impact on the rate of decline of sugar output, but the final level is  
identical. Thus, with a low supply elasticity, the transition is drawn out over a longer pe-
riod. The rate of decline between 2004 and 2010 is 18.4 percent using the standard 
elasticity and 16.5 percent with the lower elasticity. 
There are only a handful of sectors in industrial countries in which the supply elastic-
ity has any noticeable impact: wheat and sugar in the United States; rice, wheat, other 
grains, oil seeds, and sugar in the European Union; and wheat and oil seeds in Japan. The 
aggregate impacts on agricultural production are negligible, at less than 1 percent over all 
industrial countries in any given year, and at most 0.3 percent for developing countries, 
but in the opposite direction. There are no discernible impacts on welfare.  
In conclusion, lowering the supply elasticity will draw out the supply response dur-
ing the transition phase but will have no discernible long-term impact on the results. 
Supply Response in the Low-Income Countries 
This section evaluates the impact of lowering the land supply response in three re-
gions—the rest of South Asia, the SACU region, and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa—to 
examine whether low-income countries, with their potentially low supply response, will 
benefit from greater market access. This involves three parameters. First, the base-year 
land supply elasticity was reduced from 1 to 0.25. Second, the land supply asymptote was 
reduced from 20 percent of the initial land supply to 10 percent.18 These two parameters 
determine aggregate land supply. A third parameter moderates the degree of land mobil-
ity across sectors. The allocation of land across sectors is governed by a constant 
elasticity of transformation function.19 The standard transformation elasticity is 3, a rela-
tively elastic value. In the sensitivity simulation, the transformation elasticity for the three 
regions is set to 0.5. 
The lower land supply elasticities affect the baseline scenario. For the three regions 
where changes were made to supply elasticities, the overall rate of growth of agricultural 
output between 2000 and 2015 declines from 3.4 to 3.1 percent in the rest of South Asia 
and from 4.0 to 3.8 percent in rest of sub-Saharan Africa; it remains the same for SACU 
at 2.1 percent (Table 14). In all three regions, the most affected crop is plant-based fibers. 
These three regions have a sizable market share at the global level in 1997 of 1.4 percent 
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TABLE 14. Impact of lower land supply elasticities in rest of South Asia and 
sub-Saharan Africa (percent) 
 Baseline Growth Rates 2000–15  Impact of Trade Reform 
 
Standard  
Supply  
Elasticity 
Low  
Supply  
Elasticity 
Baseline 
Difference
in 2015 
Standard 
Supply  
Elasticity 
Low  
Supply  
Elasticity 
Rest of South Asia      
Rice 2.8 2.7 -2.1 3.4 2.4 
Wheat 2.7 2.6 -3.8 34.4 19.6 
Other grains 3.8 3.6 -3.6 -2.4 -1.5 
Oil seeds 4.1 3.5 -9.1 -10.0 -6.8 
Sugar 3.8 3.3 -8.9 -17.2 -12.4 
Plant-based fibers 4.5 3.7 -13.2 19.2 6.2 
Other crops 3.6 3.2 -7.3 -8.0 -5.4 
Cattle 4.0 3.7 -4.9 1.7 1.5 
Other meats 4.1 3.6 -8.3 -1.0 -1.8 
Raw milk 3.9 3.5 -6.1 1.3 1.3 
Total 3.4 3.1 -5.6 -0.2 -0.6 
Southern Africa Customs Union 
Rice 2.3 2.4 -1.7 8.8 8.4 
Wheat 1.9 1.9 -0.5 0.0 0.5 
Other grains 1.1 1.3 0.8 29.5 19.9 
Oil seeds 1.6 1.8 -1.8 9.2 8.6 
Sugar 1.3 1.4 -0.2 87.7 50.6 
Plant-based fibers 6.0 3.8 -35.9 3.4 3.6 
Other crops 2.4 2.4 -8.7 7.2 4.3 
Cattle 2.2 2.2 0.0 24.2 23.0 
Other meats 2.2 2.2 0.1 5.0 5.1 
Raw milk 2.2 2.2 0.0 -2.7 -2.6 
Total 2.1 2.1 -2.9 18.4 14.0 
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa 
Rice 3.2 3.2 -0.1 -1.2 -0.9 
Wheat 3.4 3.5 0.4 0.3 3.0 
Other grains 3.2 3.2 0.4 -0.1 3.0 
Oil seeds 3.9 3.8 -0.8 51.0 37.7 
Sugar 3.2 3.2 1.5 48.1 40.3 
Plant-based fibers 8.1 6.5 -23.2 42.8 24.9 
Other crops 4.5 4.2 -5.8 -3.6 0.0 
Cattle 3.5 3.4 -1.4 4.6 3.5 
Other meats 3.7 3.6 -1.9 -0.7 0.3 
Raw milk 3.3 3.3 -1.1 1.7 1.2 
Total 4.0 3.8 -4.1 5.6 4.9 
Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data 
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for plant-based fibers and 15 percent for rice. However, the demand for rice is much less 
elastic than for plant-based fibers. The lower supply elasticity would make land relatively 
more costly, all else equal, and given the higher demand elasticities, the higher land 
prices will be reflected in lower demand from these three regions. 
The impact of trade reform on agricultural output using both the standard and the 
lower land elasticities is broadly the same qualitatively though lower in magnitude in 
general. Considering again the case of sugar, output increases 88 percent in SACU and 
48 percent in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa using the standard supply elasticity. Sugar 
output expansion drops to 51 percent in SACU and 40 percent in the rest of sub-Saharan 
Africa when lower land supply elasticity is assumed. 
The welfare impacts are modest but measurable, and the results reflect only some of 
the possible supply constraints in low-income countries. For the three regions under ques-
tion, aggregate welfare would decline $1.1 billion compared with the standard 
assumption, and it would drop from 1.2 percent to 1.1 percent of baseline income. 
Trade Elasticities 
The most critical parameter in trade reform scenarios is trade elasticities. There is 
ongoing debate about their size. Most econometric evidence suggests that the Armington 
elasticities (measuring the degree of substitutability between domestic and imported 
goods) are low, in the range of 1 to 2.20 The studies are riddled with data problems, par-
ticularly the evaluation of unit values, and many trade economists downplay the 
empirical evidence, for two main reasons. First, low Armington elasticities lead to im-
plausible terms-of-trade effects. And second, low elasticities would suggest high optimal 
tariffs. Trade studies fall into three groups: those with relatively low elasticities (1–3), 
those with middling elasticities (3–6), and those with very high elasticities (20–40). Ex-
amples of the first are the MONASH model (Dixon and Rimmer 2002) and the standard 
GTAP model (Hertel 1996). Recent World Bank work has been using the middling elas-
ticities. High elasticities are mainly associated with the work of Harrison, Rutherford, and 
Tarr (see, for example, their 2003 article). 
The impacts of the agriculture and food trade reform were reassessed using two al-
ternative elasticities. A low scenario uses trade elasticities 50 percent lower than the 
standard, and a high scenario uses trade elasticities 50 percent higher than the standard 
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(the standard values used in this study are shown in Annex Table A.3, available from the 
authors). Each set of assumptions requires two simulation runs. A new baseline is con-
structed each time, with all assumptions identical except for the trade elasticities, and the 
reform scenario is simulated. Thus, the comparisons are between each individual baseline 
and each associated reform scenario. 
Within this range of trade elasticities the model exhibits some modest nonlinearity, 
particularly on the upside (Figure 6). For all three regions the 50 percent higher elastic-
ities lead to a greater than 50 percent rise in real income gains—particularly for 
developing regions, where the rise is almost 75 percent. On the downside, both high- and 
low-income regions see an equiproportionate fall in the real income gains relative to the 
elasticities, with a fall to 40 percent of the standard gains in the case of the middle-
income countries. The higher elasticities dampen the adverse terms-of-trade shocks from 
reforms, leading to the higher income gains. The global gains vary from a low of 
$126 billion to a high of $438 billion, with the gains at $265 billion using the standard 
elasticities.  
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Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data. 
FIGURE 6. Real income and trade elasticities 
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For some countries and regions the range of results is much broader than at the ag-
gregate level. For example, Mexico would lose some $1.2 billion with the low elasticities  
and gain $3 billion with the high elasticities compared with a gain of 0.9 with the stan-
dard elasticities. Several other regions show similar variation. The standard deviation of 
the index across all developing countries is 130 in the case of the high elasticities, 
whereas the weighted average is 170. 
The impacts on trade are similar to the impacts on income but exhibit more nonlin-
earity (Figure 7). At the global level, exports increase 80 percent using the high 
elasticities and decline 60 percent using the low elasticities (with export increases ranging 
from a low of $216 billion to nearly $1 trillion). There is also less variability across re-
gions of the model than with the income results. In isolation, the trade elasticities appear 
to have the greatest impact in determining the overall outcomes of trade reform, although 
other model changes—both in specification and in elasticities—combined may be at least 
as important in determining overall outcomes. This is an area of active research for better 
determining the bounds on the possible ranges for these elasticities. Improved data  
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Source: World Bank simulations with LINKAGE model, based on release 5.4 of the GTAP data. 
FIGURE 7. Exports and trade elasticities 
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would help, but there are still issues relating to model specification and aggregation that 
need to be thought through. 
 
Conclusions 
This quantitative assessment of the impact of agricultural and food market distortions 
on incomes, welfare, trade, and output shows that the changes in cross-regional patterns 
of output and trade tend to be much larger than are the more familiar gains to real in-
come. A decomposition of the aggregate results across policy instruments and regions 
shows that reforms in agriculture and food account for a large share of the global gains of 
reforms of total merchandise trade. This result is driven by the relatively low protection 
levels in manufacturing sectors. Another major finding is that developing countries have 
more to gain from reforming their own support policies than from reforms in high-
income countries. Symmetrically, high-income countries would experience larger welfare 
gains from their own reforms than from developing countries’ reforms. These dimensions 
of the debate are often overlooked but are crucial. Global reform leads to additive results 
with aggregate gains close to the gains from reforms in each group. A third key finding is 
that agricultural reform alone in high-income countries would create moderate gains, 
about 10 times smaller than those of a combined reform of food and agricultural markets. 
Developing countries would be negatively affected as a group, because their own distor-
tions would be exacerbated by the agricultural reforms in high-income countries. 
The results are broadly robust to changing assumptions on future agricultural produc-
tivity in developing countries, supply constraints, and level of the trade elasticities, but 
the levels of the trade elasticities remain of foremost importance. The trade effects of re-
forms are also sensitive to assumptions about agricultural productivity gains in 
developing countries. Assuming low-productivity gains leads to a reversal in the esti-
mated impact of global liberalization for industrial countries, increasing their net food 
trade surplus, as middle-income countries become much larger importers of food and ag-
ricultural products. Low-income countries experience an increase in net food trade 
surplus that is much smaller than under the higher productivity assumption. Hence, varia-
tions in productivity could lead to a different assessment of the direction of food self-
sufficiency after reform. Supply constraints do not qualitatively affect the estimated im-
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pact of trade reform on agricultural output, although estimated changes tend to be 
smaller. Higher trade elasticities dampen the adverse terms-of-trade shocks from reforms, 
leading to higher income gains. The global gains vary from a low of $126 billion with 
low elasticities to a high of $438 billion with high elasticities, with the gains at 
$265 billion using the standard elasticities. There is also higher variation at the individual 
country level. 
The changes in agricultural value added and factor prices are considerable in several 
cases. The estimated loss of rural value-added is large in Japan and the European Union, 
the Republic of Korea, Taiwan (China), and China. Thus, considerable adjustment and 
displacement of resources would take place to reflect these changes. Cairns Group coun-
tries and the United States experience sizable gains in rural value-added, as do SACU and 
the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Wages for unskilled labor in developing countries are 
moderately influenced by major policy reforms, such as in China, where they decrease, 
but more significantly in Argentina, where they increase. 
  
Endnotes 
1. The model is based at the World Bank and uses the GTAP release 5.4 dataset (see 
van der Mensbrugghe 2003 for details). 
2. East Asia is divided into four economies: China, Indonesia, Vietnam and the rest. 
South Asia has two components: India and the rest. Latin America has four econo-
mies: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and the rest. Europe and Central Asia are split into 
three components: the European Union accession countries, Turkey, and the rest. 
Sub-Saharan Africa has two components: the Southern Africa Customs Union 
(SACU) countries, and the rest. And the Rest of the World region has all other coun-
tries including the Middle East and North Africa. 
3. See van der Mensbrugghe 2003 for a technical description of the model. 
4. Agricultural policies derived from the Agricultural Market Access Database 
(AMAD) reflect 1998/99 levels of support, except for cotton, for which International 
Cotton Advisory Committee data were used (see Baffes 2004). 
5. Income elasticities are held more or less constant over the time horizon. With 
China’s rapid growth, one might anticipate a convergence of income elasticities to-
ward levels in higher-income countries and thus a dampening of food growth over 
time relative to incomes. 
6. Textile and apparel quotas that generate quota rents for exporters are converted to 
export taxes (for the country of origin). In the current simulations, these have not 
been eliminated. 
7. Technically, it is a measure of the Hicksian equivalent variation. When comparing 
aggregate welfare measures across studies, it is important to convert them to similar 
scales. Thus, $350 billion in 2015 is more or less equivalent to $250 billion in 2004 
and $200 billion in 1997, assuming an average annual global GDP growth rate of 
3 percent (all in 1997 US$, the base year of release 5 of the GTAP data set). Assum-
ing a world inflation rate of 2.5 percent over the entire period, the measured 
$250 billion in 2004 in 1997 dollars becomes $300 billion in 2004 dollars. 
8. The Mercosur preferential agreement is not incorporated in the standard GTAP data-
set but is included in the dataset used for these simulations. Efforts were made to 
minimize distortions to the original social accounting matrix while adjusting the 
original dataset. 
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9. There is also an issue regarding whether bound or applied tariffs are liberalized. 
Most developing countries have bound their tariffs at rates much higher than applied 
rates. Negotiations concern the bound tariffs; the reforms described here are relative 
to the applied tariffs. For a full reform scenario, it is not much of an issue, but for 
analyzing potential outcomes of a negotiation, it could be. 
10. See the Global Economic Prospects publications for 2002 and 2004 (World Bank 
2001, 2003). The 2002 report notes dynamic gains of $830 billion compared with 
static gains of $350 billion, with a range of up to $1,340 billion depending on some 
key parameters (see Table 6.2, page 171). 
11. Figure 1 shows output shares in the base year. One would assume that the agricul-
tural and food shares are declining over time, as income elasticities for food tend to 
be lower than for other goods and services. 
12. While the model is highly nonlinear, the results to a close approximation are rela-
tively additive. 
13. Nominal values are measured with respect to the model’s numéraire—the average 
export price of manufactured exports from industrial countries. 
14. This should be considered an upper bound on China’s potential loss since the base-
line scenario does not include the impacts of China’s accession to the WTO. Thus, 
the reform scenario is capturing the combined gains from global reform and China’s 
WTO accession, which include the gains to be had from reforming from 1998/99 
base agricultural policies. 
15. Sector-specific capital returns may be possible during the transition phase, as sectors 
in decline shed unwanted capital. The most mobile equipment will be shed first, and 
the return to the remaining capital may be priced lower than the national rate of re-
turn to capital. 
16.  In the default version of the model, cross-sectoral transformation elasticities are set 
to 3. Thus a 10 percent rise in the return in one sector (relative to the others) will 
lead to a 30 percent shift of land into that sector. Because of the finite transformation 
elasticity, land prices are sector specific. 
17. Given the aggregate nature of the model, the impacts on vulnerable countries or sec-
tors are harder to assess. In particular, sub-Saharan Africa is a heterogeneous 
subcontinent that is not reflected in the level of aggregation of this study. 
18. The land supply function is governed by a logistic curve. It is calibrated in the base 
year to an exogenously given elasticity and the value of the asymptote relative to the 
base supply level. Thus, if the asymptote is set to 1.2, land supply can increase by at 
most 20 percent above its base level. 
19. The elasticity measures the ease of shifting land from one activity to another when 
the relative price of these two activities changes. 
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20. More recent econometric work is resulting in higher estimates for the trade elastic-
ities and these are now being reflected in the forthcoming release of the GTAP 
dataset.
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